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V 
PUNISHMENT 
IN PRE-COLONIAL INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES 
OF NORTH AMERICA 
by 
Stephen CONN 
Anchorage 
A review of the literature on pre-colonial sanctions among the diverse indigenous 
cultures of Nord America has tested the analytic skills of more than one scholar, 
so diverse were the cultures in which the subject is found. A characteristic of 
many so­called primitive cultures was the extremely sophisticated means by 
which matters legal were melded and integrated into other societal functions 
requiring little or no independent superstructure that stands apart to mete out 
punishment. Put another way, when leaders, councils or Indian police emerged 
as significant agents of sanction, it was likely that a failure in the underlying, 
self-sustaining fabric of the society was the reason for this emergence of a legal 
system which seemingly stood apart. 
Social control and the attendant sanctions for deviance from norms embedded 
in indigenous society are reminiscent of the large portion of an iceberg which 
remains hidden from public view and even from legal ethnographers. How else 
might one explain the characterisation of Northern Eskimo societies by the 
brilliant scholar E. Adamson Hoebel as examples of «primitive anarchy» ? 
Eskimo societies, hunting and gathering groups which depended little if at 
all upon jural figures and institutions, offer a good starting point for examination 
of indigenous sanctions because of the absence of judges or police and their near 
total dependence on individual inculcation of social norms appropriate to the 
membership of the group. 
In nearly every indigenous society children were carefully prepared for 
membership in a society which looked to kin and allies to teach and restrain - to 
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effectively be law givers and the agents of punishment - subject to constraints upon 
intervention in another person's behavior. 
Through a process of child rearing which made a child acutely sensitive to subtle 
cues from other persons and very sensitive to teasing, ridicule and ostracism as child 
and as adult, Eskimo children were taught the limits of correct behavior. As in other 
societies young men lived apart in mens' houses and sweat baths and were counseled 
in groups. This indirect mode of instruction and correction made all the more serious, 
later, more pointed teasing or ridicule. 
Other themes that suggest precursors to forms and manner in which secular 
punishment occured existed within this subtle society. So many and complex were 
rules against taboo violation that few persons could avoid breaking one or two. 
Eskimo society had shamen fully prepared to draw upon spiritual forces to repair 
damage done or to punish ordinary persons as they chose. Confession and contrition 
were the only logical responses to a process of supernatural sanctions which whether 
secularized in the hands of shamen or others were clearly beyond avoidance and 
beyond mortal control. 
As a society dependent upon individual response to subtle cues, the watchword 
of personal behavior was to avoid involvement in interpersonal conflict at all costs 
unless one could getaway with it. Only bullies or those with extraordinary supernatural 
or physical power could be less subtle in their interpersonal activity. Yet however 
guarded in one's interaction with others, mistakes were bound to occur. Ultimate 
protection was therefore impossible, as impossible as diligent avoidance of taboo 
violation. That one would be punished for unexcused wrongs, whether intentional or 
not, was more likely than not. That one should be prepared to punish transgressors 
and manifest this capacity was not only a personal safeguard but what later 
commentators might refer to as a civic virtue, a fundamental condition of group
membership. 
No less an authority on American Indian law than Wilcomb E. Washburn finds 
retributive justice as central to theconceptoflndian law (1975). He writes, «Revenge 
was the form in which Indian justice was most often expressed. It was a noble passion, 
and an all-consuming one. A wrong hadto be repaid, and it usually was, though it took 
years of patient effort to acomplish it (17)». 
Of course Washburn is not entirely correct. In Eskimo society as in others many 
wrongs were redefined as non-wrongs as a way to avoid the duty of retribution, a duty 
shared (or imposed) on others as well. Still his point is central to our analysis of pre­
state tribal societies in North America because it provides a clue to the social meaning 
of receiving and meting out punishment. 
To prepare for retaliation to lesser or greater social infractions was a hallmark of 
one's membership in the group and not merely a reflection upon one's personal 
honor. A civic responsibility reserved for public officials and public institutions in 
later societies was privatized and delegated back to kin groups, hunting alliances and 
other smaller units of the society in all but a select series of instance where the entire 
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group was threatened by treachery, witchcraft or persons clearly endangering the
group. 
The social roots of retribution connect directly to the interdependence of
indigenous societies and their subunits. Retribution connects directly to reciprocity 
:1s a positive social force within indigenous groups. Reciprocity is built upon the 
systematic construction of debts and obligations among group members. For a 
subunit to be called upon to retaliate one must demonstrate persistent loyalty to it
whether that loyalty is formed through hunting and gathering family ties or blood 
feuds.
Retribution in Eskimo and many other societies took the form of taking a life of 
equal status in the offender's group. In Eskimo groups a blood feud triggered by 
revenge set in notion a cycle of episodic violence that had no determined end at least 
until Western intervention plucked violent aggressors fom Eskimo's midst and 
labeled them «murderers» (Hippler and Conn, 1973). Wash burn terms the League of 
the Iroquois as a confederation formed to put to rest blood feuds among tribal subunits 
(1975 : 136). 
Concern that strangers to the group were persons imbued with an obligation to 
retaliate for near-forgotten wrongs strengthened individual and group resolve to
dispatch strangers or flee them (Spencer, 1959). So, also, did fear of retaliation for 
one's own wrong or that of one's group heighten anxiety and cause persons to react 
preemptively to threats real or imagined. Finally, it may be that the intra-group
anxiety was turned outward by groups to nonmember groups in warfare.
While examples of each of these negative influences of retributive justice 
suggest how the duty to punish can be destructive to groups both internally and in 
their external relationships, more must be said about the positive and integrative
forces of that same impulse. 
Revenge as a socially acceptable form of punishment was reined in by several 
attributes of indigenous social control. In many societies compensation to the kin or
allies of victims took the place of intra-group violence. Among Navajo Indians, for 
example, where injury to property or persons was established without concern for
fault or guilt of the perpetrator, compensation was negotiated between clan groups. 
Drawing into play one's group in a dispute deepened one's own future obligations. 
In groups where leaders emerged beyond clan subunits and in times of peace, their 
political role was usually that of consensus builder and not of dictator. Each of these
social traits seems to have been influenced by the core impulse of revenge as a 
socially acceptable form of punishment.
Returning to the Eskimo example, one discovers other influences of the powerful 
outward reaching momentum of revenge on sanctions within the Eskimo scheme of
social control. Hoebel has written of song duels and other contests between would­
be antagonists. Such contests had the obvious result of ventilating and concluding 
disputes short of interpersonal violence. Yet when the jibes associated with losing a 
song duel are coupled with the more pervasive role of teasing, gossip and ostracism, 
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a clearerrelationship to the duty ofrevenge emerges. Thse latter punishments put into 
question the offender's status in the group. These subtle forms of non-intervention
in a society which questions all intervention as to its legitimacy even as it questions 
misconduct creates distance from an individual and those he hopes will protect him
in future encounters. 
Mentioned above was the tendency to overlook offenses or to redefine them as 
non-offenses ( eg. wife stealing as wife lending, theft as borrowing). Along with these
traits, a more common approach in indigenous law systems is to treat interpersonal 
disputes at the lowest possible social level. Public transgressions were limited to the 
exceptional matter and often cast as religious violaions. Individuals subject to public 
execution or banishment had disconnected themselves from the group by systematic 
rejection of group norms and subgroup ties. They had become strangers. 
To become an outcast whether banished or not was (short of execution) an
ultimate punishment for members of indigenous groups. Loss of membership and
loss of the shared obligations to retributive justice were very much the same thing.
This noble and all-consuming passion of which Washburn wrote flows not from 
barbaric impulse but from the same impulse which reduces most legal process in
indigenous society to something other than guilt-discovering procedure. To evoke 
retribution or to confess and seek the punishment which the group deems appropriate 
is to test one's membership in the group. Whether offender or offended, one's status
in the group was defined by punishment deemed socially appropriate. 
To employ the Northern Eskimo pre-contact legal process as the basis upon 
which explore the less visible realm of North American indigenous law may seem
inappropriate. However, the underlying rationale of this non-system, an iceberg with
no tip, offers the viewer an opportunity to understand the visible portion of many
other systems. Punishment in all systems are indications of the success or failure of 
private attempts at conflict avoidance and adjustment that forms «the etiquette of the 
setting» gives over to the public setting only those matters which it cannot contain.
Even then the logic of the hidden system colors the activities which are private, just 
as that same logic has filtered into tribal justice in post-colonial settings. Let us test 
this proposition against commentary on North American tribes. If we return to child
rearing we find that parents, though party to corporal punishment, may submit to
being whipped themselves or even shield the child from blows (Driver, 1961 : 459).
This does not mean that children are not whipped. What is relevant is that parents pass 
over to more remote relatives the task or raise in children the threat of the
supernatural. Ridicule also plays a part in nearly every society as an inducement to
perform according to expectation (Driver, 1961 : 462). Yet personal criticism in
public by one's immediate family was infrequent. Rather, the family «presented a 
united front to the outside and sought to protect and defend their members rather than
ridicule them» (Driver, 1961 : 463).
Blood feuds were expected between family units and not within them. Whether 
the sanction was opportunistic revenge as in the Arctic, Plateau and Plains or the
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compensation in the Northwest and select areas of the Plains states, the expectation 
was not of brother killing brother (see Reid, 1970: 86). 
Offenses against property were generally considered private. These included
sexual offenses as women were considered property in many indigenous groups. 
Their mutilation by aggrieved husbands was an oft mentioned sanction. Unless one 
compares' scratching of children to snipping away of noses, mutilation of errant
women marks a rare departure in sanctions meted out to tribal members. Physical 
torture was usually reserved for prisoners from other tribes, e.g. strangers. Among 
Northwest tribes persons might be sent into debt servitude, but unlike enslavement 
of prisoners, it was possible to buy one's relative out of enslavement. 
To connect privatised legal process with development of a public superstructure
and most importantly to explain the pre-colonial impetus for such structures is
difficult given the quality of data available. Equally difficult is a precise division 
between public and private offenses. To know the legal reaction to a particular
offense one generally must know the exact situation in which the offense occurred,
its practical consequences (the range of endangerment), the social status of the
offenders and the community's expectations of them. Age, sex, clan affiliation and
past behavior were all determinates not only of the sanction imposed, but also of the 
legal level in which the sanction was imposed. Indigenous justice was personalised 
as might be expected in tribal societies. The norms imposed were not abstractions 
unless experience had shown that they empirically impaired individual and group
survival. Usually acts were measured against their ascertainable consequences that
impaired property rights and group relationships. 
This said, one can make crude divisions as did W.W. Hill in his ethnographic 
account of the Santa Clara Pueblo (edited by Lange, 1982)» between «personal or
private law» and so-called major crimes as to sanction and legel level. Hill determined 
that deviance which primarily concerned individuls such as «various types of assault, 
malicous gossip, nagging, slovenliness, lewdness, adultery, fornication, drunkeness 
and conflicts involving damages and ownership (Lange, 1982) «was dealt with in
families or subunits while behavior deemed offensive to supernatural entities or
failure to participate in community work projects were matters appropriate for public 
resolution. Yet personal crimes in one context may be deemed public in another. 
As Driver notes in his analysis of pueblo life, theft, adultery and even homicide 
were considered «tort»s or private matters which did not reach the council «unless 
the became too violent to be handled by the proper officials» (Driver, 1961 : 338).
In those instances, one can suggest that the offender had by his act set in motion a 
social process which treatened the wellbeing of the group. The Ojibway and Micmac 
reportedly had formal trials which structured negotiations between the friends and
relatives of a deceased persons over compensation in lieu of immediate public 
execution of the murderer (Wissler, 1957 : 179). Among Apache and Navajo 
negotiations over serious offenses such as murder witchcraft and adultery were held
before headmen, but imposition of execution (if determined) was left to the victim's 
clan (Vicenti, 1972). 
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The Iroquois tried witches before a formal council but left murderers to the
revenge of immediate families unless a peace token was accepted (Wissler, 1957:
181).
These examples suggest that the need to draw into play the highest level of public 
authority may at times have related to the severity of the sanction, for some, execution
by representatives of the entire society, for others banishment to certain death (as in 
the Arctic) or for a period of years (as among Plains tribes). Imposition or at leas1 
enunciation of the sanction by the corporate tribe has the benefit of putting to res1 
blood feuds by removing their inner logic. This conclusion is bolstered by examples 
of tribal rituals among Southeastern and Plains tribes which afford amnesty ta 
participants. As in the case of the song duel, putting to rest the crime among
indigenous subgroups seems to have been a fundamental role for supraclan legal 
authorities.
Of course involvement of the larger indigenous unit where the individual is 
deemed a witch, in violation of supernatural edicts (as in Southwestern Pueblos) or 
clearly «crazy» and unfit for continued co-existence with the Eskimo group allows 
for family and allies to put distance between themselves and the miscreant even as 
it allows the community to rid itself of a threat to its very existence. These serious
cases appear to be the antithesis of the normal role of political authority of indigenous 
groups : to harmonize internal antagonisms and to confirm the authority of group
subunits in the adjustment of conflict, but they are in fact a very logical outcome of
that same process. The normal goal of most correctional process in indigenous
societies is to reintegrate the offender back into the community. Heretics, witches and
those who have repeatedly violated tribal norms are exceptional persons who cannot
be reintegrated.
One other rationale for public authorities must be explored. Police or soldier
societies among Plains tribes meted out punishments ranging from beatings and
destruction of property to banishment and even execution when other penalties fail
to reform the offender (Hoebel, 1960 : 52).
Does the existence of these tribal police and their activities refute or confirm
what I have suggested is normally a system of privatized dispute avoidance and
adjustment? Does it suggest a different role for public authority among Plains tribes ? 
A review of the literature (Provinse in Eggan, 1937 : 339-374) suggests that
police societies are a logical outgrowth of the more typical indigenous system of law
and sanction. Selected warriors dealt primarily with occurences in tribal activities
which were public, for example in restraint of fellow warriors on war parties and on 
buffalo hunts. They also intervened in intratribal disputes during those seasons when 
the tribe came together for some common purpose (Id. : 348). Thus order keeping was 
connected to specific events and circumstances. When those circumstances ended,
authority to act returned to kin groups when theft, murder, or assault ocurred.
Provinse reports that punishments inflicted by police among the Plains tribes 
were uniform : 
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Whipping or clubbing was the most frequent measure resorted to, followed up
in more serious cases by destruction of the culprit's personal property - his tipi, 
blankets, gun, bow, horses, etc. Infrequently, in the case of particularly stubborn 
individual, the death penalty was inflicted ... (Provinse, 1937 : 349). 
The context of these punishments suggests that police societies were well
integrated into the logic of tribal order keeping. The intent of sanctions with the single
exception of execution was to induce reform on the offender. Argument and feasts 
proceded restraints on warriors. Immediate evidence of contrition and promises to
behave resulted in tribal acceptance of the offender (Provinse, 350). McNickle 
recounts a case studied by Llewellyn and Hoebel of a member of the Southern 
Cheyene who was set upon, beaten and left abandoned after persistent disrespect and 
horse thievery. After coming upon members of the Northern band he confessed his
bad conduct, promised to reform and became ultimately a member of its soldier 
society (McNickle, 1975 : 56-57). Even Plains Indians banished as a result of 
repeated killings ritualistically return to their tribe and with appropriate contrition, 
are reintegrated into it.
The heightened role of police societies as an instrument of tribal law during
events that draw together tribal subunits or that unleash youthful passions does not 
seem to withdraw from tribal subunits and tribal chiefs their ultimate responsability
for dispute processing. Rather their emergence seems appropriate as to time and 
place. The punishments they mete out are also calculated to the sequence of 
persuasion deemed central to Plains justice. 
Community activities in other societies generate mutations in their law process.
For example when engaged in whaling, Eskimos who are normally immune from 
intervention by structured leadership fall under the control of the umalik or whaling 
captain. In short, the police societies are a logical extension of indigenous social
control. 
When we evaluate the role of private and public sanctions in indigenous societies 
we often discover that public and private wrongs are intertwined. Thus sanctions
must address both concerns.
Northern Athabascan villages offer a good example of the interlocking
phenomenon which offers us an opportunity to understand punishment in indigenous 
societies. These groups, made up of several small matrilineal family bands of hunters 
and gatherers in Interior Alaska were studied by me and Dr. Art Hippler less than 
seventy-five years after white contact (Hippler and Conn, 1972). 
Village chiefs were chosen by lineage heads on the basis of their reputation for
considering the entire group. They were never precipitate in their judgments. 
Disputes heard by the chief were only the most serious, those which might require
severe sanctions. Yet to mete out these sanctions, the chief depended upon adroit use
of conciliatory techniques to mold village opinion, especially the opinions of other 
villagers respected as leaders within his lineage.
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If an offender were called before village authorities both public and private
implications of his conduct wete addressed. First, his need to be reconciled with the 
village through acts that demonstrated his sorrow for his deeds that had potentially
damaged the balance between lineages in the community. Second, he had to make
amends to the victim and his kin for the wrong committed. 
Demanded then of both the chief and the offender were great powers of
persuasion. Although guilt was a foregone conclusion by his very appearance before 
the chief, his contrition would determine whether or on what terms he would be 
reconciled. Here as in other societies one observed a second role for ridicule and
stigmatization, now institutionalized to mark and punish an offender. 
Adultery was viewed as serious because it could lead to violence that in turn
could strain the fabric of mutual obligations and responsibilities that tied together not
only kin groups, but communities. 
Foradultery to be brought to the chief and his council was itself a form of sanction
as it brought shame on the offending matriline for ignoring what could lead to a
dangerous situation. When the guilty individuals appeared, they were expected to
confess. If they refused at yet a second meeting, their clothing was tom from them 
by the council and the offended spouses who were called into the second meeting to 
bring down additional pressure. If the parties admitted their guilt, the offending
husband would be ordered to remunerate the offended husband. The offended 
husband was then permitted to give a formal warning to the adulterer that if the act 
were repeated, he would kill the offender. 
The impact of this formal warning made before the chief and his council was to
create immunity for the offended husband if he killed. No revenge could be taken for
this death. Even ifhe were an important man, the offender's relatives would get a very 
small death payment. If a child had been born to the woman, her husband could also
obtain compensation.
Theft was also treated in a manner which had an impact on the thief's matriline
as well as the thief. If the thief admitted his guilt, he repaid what he had taken plus
an additional sum. His matriline was not expected to assist in the payment and, in fact,
had a vested interested in seeing that it was paid to put down antagonisms between 
the kin groups. 
If, however, the thief could show mitigating circumstances such as hunger or
great need, his matriline would be shamed into assisting in the payment of his fine.
If the thief did not repent or denied his guilt and could show no mitigating
circumstances, he might be banished for several years and fined. Chronic recidivists 
were banished for life. They could be killed if seen without fear of retaliation.
Murder was the most serious of crimes and could be punished by death. There
were various ways the problem could be handled. The chief either had to persuade
the kinsmen of the victim, the likely complainants, to accept a death payment from 
the killer, or persuade the kinsmen of the killer to accept the death sentence. A death
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payment was usually accepted of it was felt that the victim had provoked the attack, 
or the victim had been of less importance than his killer. Of concern to the chief and 
council as well as the victim's matriline was the size of the killer's matriline. Even
if it accepted the death penalty, it could remain angry at the victim's matriline. This 
could affect mutual expectations and obligations. If the death penalty was demanded 
and accepted with concurrence by the chief and council, an executioner would be
appointed. If the murderer fled, he could be killed without fear of retaliation. 
If an influencial man killed a person of similar importance, the process, both 
private and public, was put into danger. The offended matriline would not accept a 
death payment and the offending matriline would not accept a death penalty. This
forced a further stage iJ) the deliberative process. If the offender and his victim were
from different bands as well as different clans, the offended matriline would contact 
all major family heads from surrounding villages. The issue would be not merely the 
private killing but whether clans should join in war against the offending clans. Here
war sometimes did occur. In other instances protracted discussions allowed tempers
to cool and some less onerous remedy to be found.
This rather lengthy description of the interrelationship between private acts and 
their consequences to clans and even villages, drawn from my field work and that of 
Dr. Hippler, offers the viewer more than the two-dimensional view of sanctions and 
indigenous legal process that most reviewers provide us. 
We see that crimes in the indigenous context have profound implications for the
subgroups of the tribal society if they are articulated and brought forward for a public
airing. Deeper implications emerge than the impact of a punishment on the offender
and his victim, implications that lead beyond the initiation of a blood feud to the very
disintegration of the group. 
The role of leaders in order maintenance and renewal of interpersonal relations 
becomes better understood as the decisions made are elucidated. The indigenous
groups could not tolerate free floating aggression whether by its own instruments of 
punishment or by offenders. Subgroups could better afford to forget about offenses
than to pursue them to their limit. Ridicule or other techniques for ventilation of anger 
avoided the imbalances created by the very process which meted out justice. 
Although this paper is a general report on the role of punishment in pre-colonial
North America, there must be some focus on the damage done to sophisticated
indigenous law ways by contact with Western society. That damage has been
extreme. 
We have seen that childhood socialization and family control play an important
role in teaching members of the group how to behave, to be responsive to the cues 
and signals emmanating from other persons and groups. This aspect of indigenous
law ways was poisoned and destroyed by alcohol abuse in many indigenous societies. 
With alcohol came the social belief widely accepted that one who was intoxicated
was temporarily insane and notresponsible for his drunken comportment. Intoxication 
became a convenient excuse for unbridled aggression. Law systems which depended
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upon reeducation with or without further punishment could not adapt to this 
phenomenon. Alcohol and not the rational being was said to be the blame.
A second aspect of post-colonial justice was the tendency of nearly every law
system to become more centralised as it engaged non-indigenous society. Chiefs and
leaders who were no more than derivative compromise seekers were looked upon 
through Western eyes as leaders who could command without deliberation. Authority 
to deal with deviance at the lowest possible unit of tribal society was removed from 
these subunits. Indigenous justice became less proactive and preventative in its focus 
and more like that of western society. These changes did not occur over night. Many 
tribal legal systems, even those imposed upon tribes in the form of Indian Courts, 
tribal councils and Indian police, demonstrate in their day to day functioning 
appreciation for the role of family subunits and the impact of a punishment on the 
society's integrity. Yet, this said, the future does not promise a similar appreciation
for the logic of law and punishment. As older judges and councilmen resign to be
replaced with fully acculturated Native Americans, each society loses its ties with its 
own legal culture. 
The sophisticated law ways of indigenous groups in North America is slowly
displaced but not replaced by mutated forms of Western law and punishment.
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